Risky Business: Holding Hotels Accountable for Sex Trafficking by Rothberg, Rachel
Risky Business: Holding Hotels Accountable for Sex 
Trafficking 
Rachel Rothberg* 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 266 
I. THE DANGER BEHIND CLOSED DOORS ........................................................................... 269 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................ 271 
A. Baseline Liability: Historical Duties and Common Law ......................... 271 
B. A Game Changer: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 .... 276 
1. Criminal Liability ......................................................................................... 277 
2. Civil Liability .................................................................................................. 284 
C. State Gap-Fillers .................................................................................................... 286 
III. TOWARD PRIVATE REGULATION .................................................................................. 291 
A. An Insurance Primer............................................................................................ 292 
B. Act 105 Collateral Litigation ............................................................................ 294 
C. Jane Does #1-4 Case Study ................................................................................ 296 
D. 18 U.S.C. § 1595 Collateral Litigation ........................................................... 299 
IV. A MORE ACCOUNTABLE INDUSTRY .............................................................................. 303 
A. All Words, What Action? .................................................................................... 303 
B. Real Solutions ......................................................................................................... 311 
 
*  Yale Law School, J.D. 2019. Thank you to all those who made this Note 
possible—the Hon. Virginia M. Kendall and members of our “Child 
Exploitation and Human Trafficking” seminar for inspiration and insight; 
Jamie Durling for early feedback and encouragement; the Yale Law & Policy 
Review team (especially Sam Kuhn, James Fitch, Jeff Schroeder, Allison 
Rabkin Golden, Allaya Lloyd, Lily Halpern, and Hilary Higgins) for 
exceptional editing and suggestions; and my family, friends, and colleagues 
for support (and additional advice) along the way. I am deeply grateful. 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 320 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern-day sex trade is “hidden in plain sight.”1 Traffickers use 
and exploit legitimate businesses to engage in and conceal their illegal 
practices. From nightclubs to travel agencies, massage parlors to car 
dealerships, a wide variety of industries fail to scrutinize suspicious 
activity or take adequate precautions,2 while the most egregious actors 
actively solicit and benefit from “lucrative” partnerships.3 
This dynamic is particularly pronounced in the hotel and motel 
industry. Hoteliers enable the underground commercial sex economy and 
allow it to flourish, be it deliberately or inadvertently.4 The transient, 
anonymous nature of hotel guests and an institutionalized respect for their 
 
1. See, for example, the various groups using this language: Hidden in Plain 
Sight: Understanding Federal Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking Before the H. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th Cong. 76 (2018); STEPHANIE HEPBURN & RITA J. 
SIMON, TRAFFICKING AROUND THE WORLD: HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT (2013); Lindsey 
Jacobson, How to Identify Human Trafficking Victims Often “Hidden in Plain 
Sight,” ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/identify-
human-trafficking-victims-hidden-plain-sight/story?id=52258660 
[https://perma.cc/52BH-C7DD]. 
2. Meredith Dank et al., Estimating the Size and Structure of the Underground 
Commercial Sex Economy in Eight Major Cities, URB. INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR. 187-
89 (Feb. 2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/245295.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T5L3-DB7K] [hereinafter NIJ Study]; see also Janice G. 
Raymond et al., Sex Trafficking of Women in the United States: International 
and Domestic Trends, COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN 48 (Apr. 7, 
2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187774.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VWY7-XKER] (noting traffickers’ involvement in various 
legitimate businesses, including restaurants and limousine services). 
3. NIJ Study, supra note 2, at 187-89 (noting bail bondsmen, nightclub owners, 
car dealerships, photographers, sex shops, and other retail shops that offer 
“special deals” and discounts to pimps and those they trafficked). 
4. Id. at 108 (explaining the “good business strategy” of targeting certain types 
of motels and establishing good relationships with their operators). 
privacy create a perfect storm of conditions where trafficking and 
exploitation can—and do—thrive.5 
To their credit, hotel chains have begun to recognize their 
vulnerabilities and have made strides in overcoming them through 
awareness programs and training-based initiatives. I argue that these 
improvements, however, are largely ineffective. Occasionally spurred to 
action by the threat of civil or criminal litigation, hotels, on the whole, have 
remained too complacent to this human rights violation. At the very least, 
the hotel industry has yet to fully rise to the occasion and harness the 
power it has to eradicate the problem.6 
The changing national landscape and heightened media attention may 
quicken the industry’s pace.7 Despite remaining gaps in understanding the 
scope of the problem, as well as continued under-enforcement, sex-
trafficking prosecutions are on the rise,8 and new laws are regularly being 
 
5. Human Trafficking in the Hotel Industry, POLARIS PROJECT (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://polarisproject.org/blog/2016/02/10/human-trafficking-hotel-
industry [https://perma.cc/M6KP-MB8T]. 
6. The problem is not isolated to the hotel industry. See, e.g., Amy Davidson 




7. See, e.g., id.; Dan Barry & Jeffrey E. Singer, The Case of Jane Doe Ponytail, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/11/nyregion/sex-
workers-massage-parlor.html [https://perma.cc/7W6V-HKKJ]; Ryan Miller, 
There Are Red Flags Common in Human Trafficking Cases. Here’s How the 




8. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: Federal Prosecution of Human-
Trafficking Cases, 2015, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fphtc15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EB6J-FZ9T] [hereinafter BJS 2015 Special Report] (noting 
43.9% increase in number of suspects prosecuted for human trafficking 
between 2011 and 2015); see also Alyssa Currier et al., 2018 Federal Human 
Trafficking Report, HUM. TRAFFICKING INST. at ii (2019), 
https://www.traffickingmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2018-
Federal-Human-Trafficking-Report-Low-Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CTA-
WKCZ] [hereinafter 2018 Federal Human Trafficking Report] (noting that 
 
passed to expand liability and stiffen penalties.9 Hotels are not yet the 
target of criminal prosecutions, but the industry is already bracing for an 
enforcement shift, taking note of costly civil lawsuits nationwide and 
calling on the legal industry for strategic advice.10 
Insurance companies can reinforce this movement. Manipulating or 
withholding commercial insurance coverage from hotels leaves them 
financially vulnerable.11 Tying financial responsibility, via loss of insurance 
or increased policy premiums, directly to sex-trafficking activities will 
make it more difficult for hotels to turn a blind eye. It may even create a 
proactive movement within the industry, causing establishments to take 
concrete steps towards eradicating sex trafficking. 
This Note has four parts. Part I addresses the problem of sex 
trafficking in hotels and why it is important to include the hospitality 
industry in any real solution. Part II surveys the legal framework 
underpinning sex-trafficking liability. Section II.A demonstrates how the 
longstanding common-law duty of innkeepers, as well as the 
contemporary regulatory regime, charges hoteliers with legal obligations 
to their guests—and makes the industry particularly vulnerable. Section 
II.B explains the criminal and civil sanctions available against individuals 
and corporate entities under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
(TVPA), the crux of the federal regime. These sections also discuss the 
limits of the TVPA, both in terms of coverage gaps and practical 
enforcement challenges. Section II.C then turns to the TVPA’s state 
 
number of sex-trafficking prosecutions charged by the federal government 
each year has greatly increased). 
9. Human Trafficking Enactment Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-
trafficking-enactment-database.aspx [https://perma.cc/AQ6X-9K9T]. 
10. See, e.g., Bethany K. Biesenthal et al., White Paper: Human Trafficking in the 
Hospitality Industry: What Industry Participants Should Do to Protect 
Themselves and Their Customers, JONES DAY (May 2019), 
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/05/human-trafficking-in-
the-hospitality-industry [https://perma.cc/X2P8-6CKA]. 
11. See Karen Wigle Weiss, Unpacking Human Trafficking: A Survey of State Laws 
Targeting Human Trafficking in the Hospitality Industry, ECPAT-USA 7 (May 
2019), 
https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/Unpacking%20Human%20Traffi
cking-v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2VZ-UPW5] (committing to semi-annual 
survey to unpack “all the applicable [human trafficking-related] state laws 
currently in effect” and “keep up with the constantly changing laws”). 
counterparts and highlights recent lawsuits against hotels that have 
operationalized the relevant state statutes. 
Part III canvases the collateral litigation between hotels and their 
insurance providers spawned by the state and federal lawsuits. Section 
III.A provides a primer on hotel insurance coverage. Sections III.B-D 
illustrate the specific claims insurance companies have made in response 
to their insureds’ attempts to seek defense coverage or indemnification, 
and how courts have ruled. 
Finally, Part IV outlines the hotel industry’s reaction to the recent 
litigation, as well as its inadequate attempts to eradicate sex trafficking 
through self-regulation. Because both public law remedies and voluntary 
compliance are inadequate to combat sex trafficking, Section IV.B offers a 
new solution: a public-private regulatory regime where commercial 
insurers use their market power to shape the hospitality industry’s 
response to sex trafficking. Through private regulation, insurance 
companies can—and should—wield their economic power to force hotels 
to police sex trafficking on their premises. 
I. THE DANGER BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 
Statistics are hard to come by in the underground world of sex 
trafficking, which operates in the shadows and preys on vulnerable 
populations less willing or able than most to identify themselves as 
victims.12 Despite these limitations,13 it is clear that the scope of the 
problem is monumental. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) estimated 
that the 2007 sex-trafficking economy in eight major U.S. cities ranged 
from $39.9 to $290 million.14 In Atlanta and Miami, the illicit market for 
sex was larger than that for drugs and guns combined.15 
Such a profitable “trade” would be impossible without hotels. Sixty-
seven percent of the sex workers interviewed in the NIJ study indicated 
 
12. VIRGINIA M. KENDALL & T. MARKUS FUNK, CHILD EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING: 
EXAMINING GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY CHAIN CHALLENGES AND U.S. 
RESPONSES 31-35 (2d ed. 2017). 
13. 2017 Statistics from the National Human Trafficking Hotline and BeFree 
Textline, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/sites/default/
files/2017NHTHStats%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UQA-L32R] 
(noting difficulties with underreporting). 
14. NIJ Study, supra note 2, at 2. 
15. Id. at 22 tbl.3.1. 
that they traded sex acts in hotel or motel rooms.16 Between December 
2007 and December 31, 2017, the National Human Trafficking Hotline 
recorded 3,596 cases of human trafficking involving a hotel or motel.17 Its 
2016 Data Report, the most recently published, indicated that hotel/motel-
based sex trafficking had the highest percentage of cases according to 
venue.18 Furthermore, seventy-five percent of survivors in the Polaris 
Project’s July 2018 survey reported coming into contact with hotels at 
some point during their period of victimization.19 Even one attorney for 
the hospitality industry has estimated that eight out of ten human-
trafficking arrests occur at or around hotels.20 
Justice Scalia illuminated this issue in his dissent in City of Los Angeles 
v. Patel.21 He considered “the private pain and public costs” imposed by 
trafficking as “beyond contention,” and recognized that “motels provide an 
obvious haven for those who trade in human misery.”22 Scalia cited an 
example of motel owners in San Diego who were indicted for collaborating 
with members of the Crips street gang in prostituting underage girls.23 The 
motel owners had “set aside rooms apart from the rest of their legitimate 
customers where girls and women were housed, charged the gang 
 
16. Id. at 225. 
17. On-Ramps, Intersections, and Exit Routes: A Roadmap for Systems and 






18. 2016 National Hotline Annual Report, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE 5 (May 
8, 2017), https://humantraffickinghotline.org/sites/default/files/
2016%20National%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N79Z-CXF6]. 
19. On-Ramps, Intersections, and Exit Routes, supra note 17, at 16. 
20. See Rich Keating, Human Trafficking: What It Is and How It Impacts the 
Hospitality Industry, Address at the AHIA Conference, Washington, D.C. 
(Spring 2013),  http://www.ahiattorneys.org/aws/AHIA/asset_manager/
get_file/92983 [https://perma.cc/X5DG-YQ3M]. 
21. 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015). 
22. Id. at 2461 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
23. Id. at 2461-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
members/pimps a higher rate for the rooms where ‘dates’ or ‘tricks’ took 
place, and warned the gang members of inquiries by law enforcement.”24 
In examples like these, hoteliers tasked with providing a duty of care 
to their guests purposely abdicate their responsibilities. But the complicity 
is not always this conspicuous. Even hoteliers that ignore the prostitution 
occurring within their establishments cause tremendous damage merely 
by “[o]ffering privacy and anonymity on the cheap” and serving as a 
“particularly attractive site for criminal activity.”25 Given the legal 
obligations of hotels to their guests, there can be no such thing as 
passive—or fully innocent— actors. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Baseline Liability: Historical Duties and Common Law 
American innkeeping and the corresponding duties of innkeepers have 
roots in English common law,26 but such obligations date back even 
further. In ancient Roman law, innkeepers “were put under a peculiar 
responsibility, and made liable for all losses not arising from inevitable 
casualty, or overwhelming force.”27 During the Middle Ages, England’s 
Statute of Winchester imposed strict liability on innkeepers, making hosts 
liable for their guests’ behavior.28 Fourteenth-century London ordinances 
“specified that innkeepers must be good and sufficient people.”29 In the 
 
24. Id. at 2462 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Kamala D. Harris, The State of 
Human Trafficking in California, CAL. JUST. DEP’T 25 (2012), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ht/human-trafficking-
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/K73T-JWVA]); see also NIJ Study, supra note 2, 
at 188 (trafficker explaining actions of a hotel that “showed [him] love” by 
allowing him to “stay there in an unregistered room”). 
25. Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2457 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
26. See, e.g., Darby v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 753 N.E.2d 160, 162 (N.Y. 
2001) (noting the development of innkeeper’s duties over the course of 
centuries). 
27. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 458, at 389 (7th ed. 1863) 
[hereinafter J. STORY, COMMENTARIES]. 
28. David S. Bogen, The Innkeeper’s Tale: The Legal Development of a Public 
Calling, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 51, 60 (1996). 
29. Id. at 61. They also had to “warn their guests of the city’s law against 
carrying arms.” Id. 
nineteenth century, Justice Story recognized that “the doctrines thus 
asserted in the Roman law, in respect to innkeepers, seem to have been 
generally incorporated into the jurisprudence of Continental Europe,”30 
including Spain, France, Scotland, and “probably in that of every other 
nation, whose jurisprudence had its origin in the Roman law.”31 
Innkeepers, as a kind of “public servants,”32 were bound to treat their 
guests with “uncommon care.”33 Their inns were subject to comprehensive 
regulation—including frequent, warrantless searches—in eighteenth-
century America because of the “extraordinary temptation to fraud, or 
danger of plunder.”34 Public policy justified the intrusions, as travelers 
were “obliged to rely almost implicitly on the good faith of innholders, 
whose education and morals are none of the best, and who might have 
frequent opportunities of associating with ruffians and pilferers.”35 
As Justice Scalia indicated in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, today’s hotels 
and motels face temptations similar to their commercial forebears. Their 
“unique public role”36 has continued to subject them to “unique public 
duties”37 derived from the common law and now often imposed by 
regulatory schemes. Modern-day innkeepers and hotel owners are tasked 
with at least a reasonable duty of care for their guests’ safety, comfort, and 
convenience.38 Hoteliers in some jurisdictions “owe their guests a 
heightened duty of care exceeding that which business invitors owe 
their invitees.”39 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, this elevated 
 
30. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 467, supra note 27, at 399. 
31. Id. 
32. Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213, 173 Eng. Rep. 94 (1835). 
33. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 470, supra note 27, at 401. 
34. Id. § 464, at 396. 
35. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2459 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 




38. See, e.g., Young-Gibson v. Patel, 957 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272-73 (W.D.N.Y. 2013); 
Bell v. Daugherty, 200 N.W. 708, 709 (Iowa 1924); see also 40A AM. JUR. 2D 
Hotels, Motels, Etc. § 70 (2019). 
39. Jarmak v. Ramos, No. 6:10-cv-00048, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107031, at *4-5 
(W.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2011); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. 
LAW INST. 1965) (“Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect”); 
 
duty requires innkeepers to “take reasonable action” to protect their 
guests against an “unreasonable risk of physical harm,” to render aid if 
they know or have reason to know a guest is ill or injured, and even to 
“care for them until they can be cared for by others.”40 
Local, state, and federal statutes and regulations have supplemented 
the hoteliers’ common-law duty, but they have not supplanted it.41 These 
various sources of liability allow for a multiplicity of suits and provide an 
effective, hybrid arsenal with which plaintiffs can maximize pressure. For 
instance, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office has incorporated the old 
common-law theory of public nuisance into a new regulatory regime in its 
Citywide Nuisance Abatement Program. In August 2017, the L.A. City 
Attorney’s Office reached a settlement with the owner of a local Motel 6 in 
Sylmar, California for the rampant sex trafficking and other criminal 
activity on premises.42 The terms of the agreement committed the motel 
owner to “maintain[ing] a broad array of physical and managerial 
improvements for public safety”43 and also required Motel 6 “to pay 
 
see also Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1984) (explaining § 
314A’s exception to the general rule that there is no affirmative duty to act); 
Kveragas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 733 F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1984) (“The 
common law has long recognized the special legal relationship between 
innkeepers and registered guests.”). 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Trask-
Morton v. Motel 6 Operating Ltd. P’ship, 534 F.3d 672, 680-81 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“Under Indiana law, an innkeeper owes a duty to his guests to render 
aid after he knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to 
care for them until they can be cared for by others.”). 
41. See, e.g., Verdugo v. Target Corp., 770 F.3d 1203, 1214 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]s 
a general rule, unless expressly provided, statutes should not be interpreted 
to alter the common law, and should be construed to avoid conflict 
with common law rules.” (citations omitted)); Copeland v. Lodge Enters., 
Inc., 4 P.3d 695, 700 (Okla. 2000) (“An innkeeper in Oklahoma continues to 
have a status-based, common-law duty of care to a guest. This duty remains 
unaltered by inspection and licensing statutes enacted under the police 
power of the state.”). 
42. Anne Teigen, Prosecuting Human Traffickers: Recent Legislative Enactments, 
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES 7 (Sept. 2018),  http://www.ncsl.org/
Portals/1/HTML_LargeReports/Prosecuting_Traffickers_091818_32767.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GY6J-ZSPS]. 
43. L.A. City Attorney Mike Feuer Secures Settlement with the Owner of Motel 6 to 
Curb Rampant Drug, Prostitution at Sylmar Location; Owner of Motel Chain to 
 
$250,000 to fund a new City Attorney program to detect, deter and 
prevent human trafficking in and around Los Angeles County.”44 
Although modern-day hoteliers have moved away from their 
traditional role as quasi-public servants and have fully embraced the 
corporate world,45 the hospitality industry remains inextricably linked 
to—and defined by—its public-facing roots. A discriminatory hotel served 
as a catalyst for change during the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s,46 
and hotels, as public accommodations, have now been placed under the 
purview of the U.S. Constitution. In addition to Fourteenth Amendment 
discrimination concerns, hotels frequently encounter Fourth Amendment 
issues as well. During the eighteenth century, the balance between 
protecting the privacy of guests and protecting the public tipped in favor of 
law enforcement raids of inns.47 Today’s answer is more complex: Our 
modern culture has a deep respect for privacy, but until what point?48 
 
Also Pay $250k for New Anti-Human Trafficking Program, L.A. CITY ATT’Y MIKE 




Trafficking-Program [https://perma.cc/8SD8-G9KG] (canvassing changes 
agreed to as part of settlement). 
44. Id. 
45. See, e.g., Economic Impact of the US Hotel Industry, OXFORD ECON. 4 (June 30, 
2016), 
https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/Economic%20Impact%20Study
%20%28Oxford%29_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTG9-JLYN] (estimating that 
the hotel industry supported $1.1 trillion of economic output in 2015 in a 
study funded by the hotel industry’s advocacy and lobbying group, AHLA). 
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a), (b)(1) (2018) (prohibiting discrimination on the 
ground of race, color, religion or national origin in establishments providing 
lodging to transient guests); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 247 (1964) (holding the hotel liable for discrimination based on 
race); see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“No 
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in . . . any 
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases 
to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”). 
47. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
48. See KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 12, at 36 (“In a society increasingly self-
conscious about questioning personal relationships or interfering in other’s 
business, this level of tolerance has the reverse effect of enabling the 
 
In 2015, the Supreme Court weighed in on the debate, expanding 
constitutional privacy protections to twenty-first-century innkeepers and 
their guests. In City of Los Angeles v. Patel, the Court’s latest word on the 
issue, hotel operators brought a Fourth Amendment challenge against a 
Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) provision, which required them to 
gather and maintain certain information about guests and make such 
information available to LAPD Officers “on demand” and without a 
warrant. If the owners did not immediately comply with law enforcement, 
they could face jail time. 
Over a strenuous dissent by Justice Scalia, the Patel Court held the 
ordinance facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because 
it penalized the operators “for declining to turn over their records without 
affording them any opportunity for precompliance review.”49 Despite 
fractures along other lines, the Court unanimously recognized that 
trafficking activities would constitute “exigent circumstances,” thus 
allowing police to dispose of the warrant requirement prior to search.50 
For victims, however, this concession may provide little comfort. 
Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted, “[t]he whole reason criminals use motel 
rooms in the first place is that they offer privacy and secrecy, so that police 
will never come to discover these exigencies.”51 The recordkeeping 
requirement, combined with warrantless inspections, would deter 
criminals, who “never know when law enforcement might drop by to 
inspect.”52 Permitting warrantless inspections would thwart the use of 
motel rooms for privacy and secrecy, and the exigencies occurring behind 
the walls would finally see the light of day—there would be no time “for 
 
traffickers to operate with impunity in even the most advanced 
communities.”); see also Camila Domonoske, Motel 6 Agrees to Pay Millions 
After Giving Guest Lists to Immigration Authorities, NPR (Nov. 6, 2018 3:57 
PM EST), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/06/664737581/motel-6-agrees-
to-pay-millions-after-giving-guest-lists-to-immigration-authoriti 
[https://perma.cc/MTA3-EBQD] (discussing a $7.6 million settlement when 
multiple Motel 6 locations turned over their entire guest registries to ICE on 
a daily basis, which allegedly violated consumer privacy rights and 
discriminated on the basis of race by targeting Latinos). 
49. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447 (2015). 
50. Id. at 2454. 
51. Id. at 2461 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 2462 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
making fraudulent entries in their guest register.”53 To avoid the Patel 
problem, hotel operators should thus be incentivized to consent to random 
spot checks through private regulation. 
B. A Game Changer: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the United Nations adopted a 
“Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” today most 
commonly referred to as the Palermo Protocol.54 The Palermo Protocol 
provides an international definition of what constitutes “trafficking in 
persons” in order to facilitate transnational cooperation in investigating 
and prosecuting these cases.55 Now signed by 117 countries,56 it has 
revolutionized the way nations deal with human trafficking. 
In order to help implement the Palermo Protocol and close gaps in 
domestic law, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 
2000 (TVPA). The bipartisan law (Public Law 106-386) was signed by 
President Clinton on October 28, 2000, and was reauthorized in 2003, 
2005, 2008, and 2013.57 The statutory scheme approaches trafficking in 
three ways—prevention of sex trafficking, protection of victims, and 
prosecution of offenders58—and provides the main legal framework for 
prosecuting traffickers and their conspirators criminally and civilly.59 
 
53. Id. 
54. 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. 
55. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 12, at 144. 
56. 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. 
57. Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and 
Reauthorizations FY 2017, ALLIANCE TO END SLAVERY & TRAFFICKING (Jan. 11, 
2017, 8:40 AM), https://endslaveryandtrafficking.org/summary-trafficking-
victims-protection-act-tvpa-reauthorizations-fy-2017-2 
[https://perma.cc/3X39-KZ2N]. For simplicity, I will hereinafter refer to the 
most-up-to-date law, incorporating all amendments since 2000, as the 
“TVPA.” 
58. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 12, at 119. 
59. See William M. Sullivan & Fabio Leonardi, Alert: Prosecuting Corporations 
that Benefit Financially from Human Trafficking, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW 
PITTMAN LLP 3 (July 24, 2019), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/print/
content/25738/prosecuting-corporations-that-benefit-financially-from-
 
1. Criminal Liability 
Section 1591 of the TVPA criminalizes “sex trafficking”—broadly 
defined as causing a person to engage in a “commercial sex act”60—in two 
primary ways. First, the statute targets the offender who knowingly 
“recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, 
maintains, patronizes, or solicits” a person by means of “force, threats of 
force, fraud, coercion” (or a combination thereof), while knowing or 
recklessly disregarding the fact that such means have been used to cause 
the person to engage in a commercial sex act.61 Critically, no such means 
are required if the victim, the person caused to engage in the commercial 
sex act, “has not attained the age of 18 years.”62 Alternatively, anyone who 
“benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation 
in a [sex trafficking] venture,” while knowing or recklessly disregarding 
that such means of force, threat, fraud, or coercion have been used against 
a victim, can be found guilty of sex trafficking under § 1591(a)(2). 
Both hotels and their employees can be criminally punished for 
keeping a victim pre- or post-transport (e.g., “harboring”); unlike 
smuggling, transport is not a necessary condition for a human-trafficking 
prosecution.63 Furthermore, under § 1591(a)(1), it is sufficient that the 
employee knowingly “harbored” the victim by renting a room to the 
trafficker while knowing or recklessly disregarding that “means” of force, 
threats of force, fraud, or coercion were being used against the victim—a 
hotel employee need not personally use those means against the victim.64 
And if the employee had a “reasonable opportunity” to observe a minor 
 
human-trafficking.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TLL-PBDE] (discussing 
amendments, like 2018’s FOSTA, that have strengthened the TVPA). 
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3) (2018) (“The term ‘commercial sex act’ means any sex 
act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any 
person.”). 
61. Id. § 1591(a)(1). “Reckless disregard” is an insufficient mens rea for the act 
of advertising though. Id. 
62. Id. § 1591(a). 
63. KENDALL & FUNK, supra note 12, at 39. 
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); see Shea M. Rhodes, Sex Trafficking and the Hotel 
Industry: Criminal and Civil Liability for Hotels and their Employees, VILL. L. 
INST. TO ADDRESS COM. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 4 (2015), 
http://cseinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Hotel_Policy_Paper-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KL2-5CCN]. 
victim, that employee can be held strictly liable; the employee will be 
guilty of sex trafficking merely by virtue of having “harbored” the victim by 
renting out the hotel room where the commercial sex act occurs.65 
“Harboring,” however, can only go so far. In most cases, even if the 
“harboring” is uncovered and criminally charged, which is already rare, 
prosecutors have to contend with mens rea defenses. Many hotel 
operators or mid-level managers naively (albeit genuinely) believe 
trafficking is not occurring on their premises.66 Or, they may confuse 
prostitution with sex trafficking and are thereby reluctant to interfere with 
what they consider to be voluntary choices of adult women.67 Thus, these 
individuals will argue that they lack the requisite mens rea for criminal 
liability. In many scenarios, this defense will be successful. Even if the 
owners should have known about the trafficking, this negligently culpable 
mental state will not meet the higher level of culpability required by the 
TVPA’s criminal provisions—knowing with respect to the trafficking act, 
and knowing or recklessly disregarding the means used (at least with 
respect to those victims over the age of eighteen).68 
But the high mens rea burden could be eased in some cases by using 
the doctrine of willful blindness, considered a substitute for knowledge in 
all federal courts.69 Willful blindness describes the mental state of 
someone seeking to avoid liability by intentionally keeping himself 
unaware of information that would otherwise render him liable.70 Using 
 
65. 18 U.S.C § 1591(c); Rhodes, supra note 64, at 4. 
66. See, e.g., Giovanna L.C. Cavagnaro, Sex Trafficking: The Hospitality Industry’s 
Role and Responsibility, CORNELL U. SCH. HOTEL ADMIN. app. I (2017) (compiling 
comments left by hotel survey respondents). 
67. For instance, after an enlightening conversation with a manager at the 
Fairmont Miramar in Santa Monica, California, it became clear to me that an 
incorrect view of what constitutes sex trafficking leads to completely 
discounting—and inadvertently avoiding—the issue; this oversight stems 
not from bad faith but from misinformation. 
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). 
69. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A, 563 U.S. 754, 769 n.9 (2011) (citing 
cases in all federal circuits recognizing the “willful blindness” doctrine). 
70. Although the precise definition is somewhat unclear, it generally exists if a 
person (1) is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in 
question and (2) either takes deliberate action to avoid confirming the fact 
or purposely fails to investigate in order to avoid confirmation of the fact. Id. 
at 769. 
this doctrine, the government can meet its burden of proving knowledge 
under the TVPA by, instead, proving a defendant’s “deliberate” failure to 
inquire.71 Through an expansive application of willful blindness,72 
managers and employees of a motel where sex trafficking occurs can 
arguably be considered willfully ignorant without a showing that they 
either could inquire (or inquire effectively), or had a duty to inquire. 
Whether or not the government will pursue this approach remains to 
be seen; in many instances, the government will devote its limited 
resources to investigating and prosecuting the cases where proving the 
defendants’ guilty mind is easier. Take, for instance, the case of Kanubhai 
Patel, the former owner of the Riviera Motel in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
Patel was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2)—the TVPA’s “profiteering” 
section—and § 1591(b)(1) for “knowingly benefit[ting] financially” from 
his participation in a sex-trafficking venture.73 In his managerial role, Patel 
regularly rented rooms to individuals charged as sex-trafficking co-
conspirators, “knowing they were pimps who forced and coerced women 
to engage in prostitution.”74 He would charge them higher rates than other 
guests and open the motel’s gate to allow the women to bring customers 
back to their rooms.75 
Moreover, Patel learned of brutal beatings of the women and saw the 
aftermath in the motel rooms—the broken toilet and sink, as well as the 
blood on the walls—but agreed not to call the police after his co-
conspirator reimbursed him for the damage.76 Patel also knew that the 
 
71. See id.; see also United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918 n.4 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“A willfully blind defendant is one who took deliberate actions to 
avoid confirming suspicions of criminality.”). 
72. See, e.g., Heredia, 483 F.3d at 928 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“The majority 
converts the statutory element that the possession be ‘knowing’ into 
something much less—a requirement that the defendant be suspicious and 
deliberately avoid investigating . . . . The majority seems to mean that if 
someone can investigate, they must.”). 
73. See Second Superseding Indictment at 5, United States v. Robinson et al., No. 
2:13-CR-00286-SSV-JVM (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2014). 
74. Louisiana Motel Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
(July 1, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louisiana-motel-owner-
pleads-guilty-sex-trafficking-case [https://perma.cc/C9AD-WDP8]. 
75. Id.; see Factual Basis, Robinson, No. 2:13-CR-00286-SSV-JVM (E.D. La. July 1, 
2015). 
76. Louisiana Motel Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case, supra note 74. 
pimps would take the women’s identification cards and rent hotel rooms 
in their names, but he did not report the traffickers to the police.77 
Although the evidence of the requisite mens rea appeared strong enough 
to support a § 1591 conviction, Patel was allowed to plead guilty to one 
count of benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in 
persons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1593A.78 
* * * * 
Hotels as entities can be held criminally liable for sex trafficking in two 
primary ways. First, a corporation can be held vicariously liable for acts its 
employees commit in violation of § 1591(a)(1) if the employees were 
acting as agents of the hotel. Applying the test for vicarious liability,79 
renting a room is within the scope of a hotel employee’s position, and the 
hotel receives a financial benefit from that room rental. Arguably, then, the 
hotel could be criminally liable by imputation as long as its employee 
either knew or recklessly disregarded that a § 1591(a)(1) violation was 
occurring.80 
Second, a hotel can be prosecuted under § 1591(a)(2) if it knowingly 
received a financial benefit from participation in a venture that violates                  
§ 1591(a)(1). By renting a room to a trafficker under criminal 
circumstances (as defined by § 1591(a)(1)), the hotel is “effectively 




78. See Plea Agreement, Robinson, No. 2:13-CR-00286-SSV-JVM (E.D. La. July 1, 
2015). He was ultimately sentenced to five years of probation and a $10,000 
fine. Remaining Defendants Sentenced for Roles in Sex Trafficking Scheme, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (July 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edla/pr/
remaining-defendants-sentenced-roles-sex-trafficking-scheme 
[https://perma.cc/X5BY-VWQH]. According to DOJ, § 1593A is usually 
inappropriate to charge because §§ 1589 and 1591 “include identical 
benefiting provisions and carry higher penalties.” Benjamin J. Hawk et al., 
Chapter 77 and Beyond: Charging Strategies in Human Trafficking Cases, 65 
U.S. ATT’Y’S BULL., at 45, 48 (Nov. 2017). Thus, § 1593A may be used to 
resolve a case pre-indictment or pre-trial and obtain restitution. Id. 
79. The test for attributing criminal liability to a corporation is “whether the 
agent is performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform, and 
those acts are motivated—at least in part—by an intent to benefit the 
corporation.” United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). 
80. See Rhodes, supra note 64, at 4 n.11. 
81. Id. at 5. 
Some of the challenges with holding hotels criminally responsible 
mirror the general difficulties with corporate criminal liability, such as 
who should be blamed in global hotel chains that employ hundreds of 
thousands of agents.82 Criminal liability may sufficiently deter low-level 
on-site employees or mid-level managers who take bribes from traffickers, 
but such conduct would qualify for individual liability through 
conspiracy83 (or the substantive crime of trafficking).84 
For larger hotels, the government’s goal in prosecution might be 
primarily financial—to extract a large fine or restitution. Similar to the 
white-collar prosecutions after the 2008 recession, federal prosecutors are 
well positioned to leverage reputational harm and stock market shocks 
that accompany a corporate indictment in order to negotiate with a large, 
publicly traded hotel chain. And as in the white-collar sphere, a hotel chain 
might request a non-prosecution agreement or a deferred-prosecution 
agreement in exchange for paying a hefty fine, implementing internal 
reforms, and hiring a monitor to ensure compliance. Though this sort of 
deal would mitigate the negative press coverage and many collateral 
consequences that would otherwise accompany an indictment, we should 
question whether the failure to publicly shame a corporation that permits 
human rights violations is the correct response. A publicized indictment 
may be a worthy deterrent for other chains to stamp out misconduct more 
aggressively. Furthermore, subjecting a hotel to what effectively amounts 
to a monetary penalty and increased regulation begins to bridge the 
criminal-civil divide. 
Nevertheless, the reality is that financial institutions look significantly 
different than even publicly traded hotels. Much like the fast food industry, 
the hotel industry is heavily franchised.85 The “flag” or “brand”—Choice, 
 
82. For more background on corporate criminal liability, see generally United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE 
STITH & BILL STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES (2d ed. 2019); and BRANDON L. 
GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 
(2014). 
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). 
84. An additional problem prevalent in corporate criminal liability exists: High-
level managers point the blame downward while claiming ignorance, and 
low-level employees argue their commands were coming from the top. 
85. Ellen Meyer, The Origins and Growth of Franchising in the Hotel Industry, 
LODGING MAG. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://lodgingmagazine.com/the-origins-
and-growth-of-franchising-in-the-hotel-industry/ [https://perma.cc/CU7Q-
 
IHG, or Marriott, for instance—is at the top of the pyramid.86 That brand 
contracts with a hotel owner to own and operate his hotel under its brand 
name.87 That owner may then run the hotel or he may hire a separate 
management company; it is thus common for multiple companies to be 
sandwiched between the deep-pocketed brand and any on-the-ground 
criminal activity. 
The brand protects itself by claiming it has no operational control at a 
particular facility and that even though the employees are wearing their 
uniforms, they are not actually “employees” of the brand. Perhaps more 
importantly, the flag will point to its “brand standards.”88 Management 
agreements will include similar provisions explicitly stating that the 
management company is to operate the hotel in accordance with the brand 
standards, one of which is to make sure no crimes are committed there. 
The savviest brands have already begun to include a specific prohibition 
against human trafficking.89 
 
LPUA]. For background information, I drew on conversations I had with 
industry experts as well. 
86. Our Brands, CHOICE HOTELS (2019), https://choicehotelsdevelopment.com/
brand-portfolio/ [https://perma.cc/MCL5-K6EE]; Our Brands, IHG (2019), 
https://choicehotelsdevelopment.com/brand-portfolio/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RDV-EFXU]; Explore Our Brands, MARRIOTT BONVOY 
(2019), https://www.marriott.com/marriott-brands.mi [https://perma.cc/
B45K-T8TN]. 
87. Deciding on a brand is considered one of the most important choices for 
building a hotel. See, e.g., Larry Mogelonsky, Finding Your Flag, 
HOSPITALITYNET (March 17, 2017), 
https://www.hospitalitynet.org/opinion/4081647.html 
[https://perma.cc/5DTT-J4GP]. 
88. Enforcement of and compliance with brand standards also varies 
tremendously among the flags. See, e.g., Chekitan Dev et al., Hotel Brand 
Standards: How to Pick the Right Amenities for Your Property, 17 CORNELL 
HOSPITALITY RES. BRIEF 3 (2017); Graeme Dickson, The Importance of Brand 
Standards, INSIGHTS (Dec. 8, 2016), https://insights.ehotelier.com/
insights/2016/08/12/importance-brand-standards/ 
[https://perma.cc/LM2T-NJDX]. 
89. See, e.g., No Vacancy for Child Sex Traffickers Impact Report: The Efficacy of 
ECPAT-USA’s Work to Prevent and Disrupt the Commercial Sexual Exploitation 




Despite these multiple layers of insulation, corporate criminal liability 
has worked in some cases. For example, in United States v. Singh,90 a 
privately held motel was prosecuted for prostitution and money 
laundering offenses under the Mann Act because prosecutors were unable 
to convict the individual who was president of the corporation. The 
corporation was considered the actual target’s “alter-ego.” This case 
demonstrates that these prosecutions might be successful where an owner 
who has engaged in wrongful conduct himself is closely aligned with the 
corporate entity. 
Even if the corporation is not the target’s “alter-ego,” it may be 
beneficial to indict a hotel operator and the entity that owns the hotel, 
either for conspiracy or financial purposes, or both. For instance, in 
October 2017, Faizal Bhimani, a hotel operator in Pennsylvania, was 
indicted on one count of sex trafficking by force and coercion,91 as well as 
one count of sex trafficking by force and coercion conspiracy.92 The 
indictment also charged Om Sri Sai, Inc., the entity that owns the hotel, 
with the same crimes.93 Importantly, the government provided a forfeiture 
allegation under § 1594(d), which included all of the defendants’ assets, 
including the hotel’s liquor license and real property.94 
Overall, though, federal law enforcement is missing the opportunity to 
hold hotels criminally responsible under the TVPA for what goes on 
behind closed doors. In 2018, 383 criminal sex trafficking cases identified 
the location where a commercial sex act took place; of those, “81.5% (312) 
involved a victim who was exploited for sex at a hotel.”95 Specific hotels 
were named in 174 criminal cases, and the top five offenders were “small-
 
[https://perma.cc/8B33-5MQJ] [hereinafter No Vacancy Report] (noting 
that, “as a brand standard, Hyatt International mandates that all hotels take 
human trafficking training”). 
90. 518 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2008). 
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1). 
92. Id. § 1594(c). See Indictment at 1-3, United States v. Bhimani, No. 3:17-CR-
00324-ARC (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2017); Bartonsville Man and Hotel Charged 
With Sex and Drug Trafficking, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/bartonsville-man-and-hotel-
charged-sex-and-drug-trafficking [https://perma.cc/DMU9-JZ7F]. 
93. Indictment at 1-3, Bhimani, No. 3:17-CR-00324-ARC. 
94. Id. at 6. 
95. 2018 Federal Human Trafficking Report, supra note 8, at iv. 
chain hotels or hotels not part of a chain (62), Super 8 (31), Motel 6 (29), 
Red Roof Inn (20), and Days Inn (19).”96 Yet of the 1,217 criminal 
defendants in federal human trafficking cases in 2018, only two were 
entities—and only one entity was a hotel in a sex-trafficking case.97 
2. Civil Liability 
With limited governmental resources and a higher burden of proof on 
the criminal side, a civil remedy can pick up the slack in holding traffickers 
accountable for their actions.98 Civil remedies can be more effective and 
more flexible—victims who bring civil suits “may fully participate in the 
proceedings if they so choose”99 and may opt for strength in numbers, 
bringing class actions against their traffickers.100 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, any trafficking victim can bring a civil action 
against the perpetrator, or against whomever “knowingly benefits, 
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a 
venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an 
act in violation of this chapter.”101 Thus, a hotel can be held liable to a 
victim for civil damages—compensatory and punitive102—if it should have 
 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 16; see also id. at iv (noting that the federal government did not initiate 
any “new prosecutions against entity defendants in 2018”). 
98. Of the 355 suspects investigated for TVPA offenses whom U.S. attorneys 
declined to prosecute in 2015, 64.2% were declined due to insufficient 
evidence, by far the most common reason. BJS 2015 Special Report, supra 
note 8, at 7 tbl. 4. That the matter was subject to the authority of another 
jurisdiction (13.8%) or a prioritization of federal resources (9%) were the 
next most common reasons. Id. 
99. 2018 Federal Human Trafficking Report, supra note 8, at 50. 
100. Id. at 50-51 (noting that 19 of the 91 active civil human trafficking cases in 
2018 were class actions). 
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
102. See Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “the 
TVPA permits recovery of punitive damages because [§ 1595] creates a 
cause of action that sounds in tort and punitive damages are available in tort 
actions under the common law”); Francisco v. Susano, 2013 WL 2302691, at 
*4-6 (10th Cir. May 28, 2013) (holding that § 1595 allows trafficking victims 
to recover compensatory and punitive damages). 
known it was renting a room to a trafficker for the purpose of a 
commercial sex act.103 
Indeed, civil human trafficking suits against entities in 2018 were 
much more common than criminal prosecutions of entities: Of the 390 
defendants in active civil cases, 43.8% (171) were entities, compared to 
less than 1% (2) in active criminal cases.104 
The first civil TVPA suit against the hospitality industry by a sex-
trafficking victim was filed in March 2019.105 M.A., an Ohio resident, 
brought one cause of action under § 1595. She alleged that all 
defendants—including Wyndham, IHG, and Choice brand hotels106—
”knowingly benefited from participating in a venture which they knew was 
engaged in illegal sex trafficking” in violation of §1591(a)(2).107 Her 
complaint described the means by which the defendants engaged “in acts 
and omissions that were intended to support, facilitate, harbor, and 
otherwise further the trafficker’s sale and victimization of the Plaintiff for 
commercial sexual exploitation,”108 as well as the “obvious” warning signs 
that went unnoticed.109 
M.A.’s attorneys presented her case with a keen awareness they were 
breaking new ground. They embraced the role, opening with a dramatic 
history and condemnation of hotels’ complicity in sex-trafficking 
 
103. See Rhodes, supra note 64, at 4; see also Biesenthal et al., supra note 10 
(“Counsel representing individual plaintiffs in private actions under the 
TVPRA regard the statute as opening the door to large damage awards 
against corporate entities, including hospitality locations where trafficking is 
alleged to have occurred.”). 
104. 2018 Federal Human Trafficking Report, supra note 8, at 55. The comparison 
is not entirely analogous, though, because unlike in the criminal context—
where the overwhelming majority of all active cases in 2018 were sex 
trafficking (645 out of 680), see id. at 6, the reverse was true in civil suits 
(where 80 out of 91 total active suits were labor trafficking), see id. at 50. 
105. Complaint, M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, No. 2:19-CV-00849-ALM-EPD 
(S.D. Ohio March 8, 2019). 
106. Id. at 21. To support her claim, throughout the complaint, she referred to 
Wyndham and the local properties (Days Inn by Wyndham) as “alter egos, 
representatives, agents, or co-conspirators.” Additionally, she alleged an 
agency relationship between IHG and Defendant Crown Plaza. Id. 
107. Id. at 35, ¶ 107. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 19, ¶ 55. 
ventures.110 The complaint canvassed the actions taken by governmental 
and non-governmental organizations to combat the crime, but concluded 
that “[t]he complicity of the hospitality industry is essential to the 
perpetuation of human trafficking, allowing traffickers to remain transient, 
collect profits, and evade detection.”111 
However, if this is the first civil suit against hotels almost two decades 
after the TVPA was first passed—and there is no guarantee of ultimate 
success given the franchised nature of the hotel industry112—we cannot 
solely rely on federal litigation. We need further pressure points to create 
the change. 
C. State Gap-Fillers 
Even if sex-trafficking violations should be made a federal case given 
their gravity and complexity, realistically, the federal criminal justice 
system cannot effectively prosecute every such incident in the United 
States.113 The federal government has therefore sought to partner with 
and train local and state governments to improve their ability to combat 
the crime.114 
 
110. Id. at 3, ¶ 1. 
111. Id. 
112. M.A.’s attorneys refer to “hotel and hotel brands” throughout the complaint, 
demonstrating an understanding of how the hospitality branding structure 
complicates the litigation. See, e.g., id. at 5, 7, 9, 16-17, 26. 
113. Amy Pharell et al., Identifying Challenges to Improve the Investigation and 
Prosecution of State and Local Human Trafficking Cases, URB. INST. JUST. POL’Y 
CTR. 2 (2012), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/identifying-
challenges-improve-investigation-and-prosecution-state-and-local-human-
trafficking-cases/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/VZ4Y-R7A6]. 
114. See, e.g., id. at 3; Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of 
Human Trafficking in the United States, 2013-2017, PRESIDENT’S INTERAGENCY 
TASK FORCE TO MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (Jan. 2014), 
https://www.ovc.gov/pubs/FederalHumanTraffickingStrategicPlan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N52F-Q3RS] (noting that the task force’s first goal is to 
“align efforts” by “promot[ing] a strategic, coordinated approach to the 
provision of services for victims of human trafficking at the federal, regional, 
state, territorial, tribal, and local levels”). 
Meanwhile, state legislatures have enacted their own sex-trafficking 
statutes modeled after the TVPA’s federal proscriptions.115 Indeed, many 
states have gone beyond the TVPA to fill the gaps in both civil and criminal 
liability and widen the liability net.116 Notably, numerous legislatures have 
targeted the hospitality industry through signage requirements.117 Thus, 
hotel chains are already, in theory, subject to liability under our criminal 
law and civil laws, both federal and local. 
Groundbreaking lawsuits have capitalized on this legal exposure and 
are now testing the limits of these state statutes; in doing so, they have 
raised alarm bells in the hotel industry.118 For instance, Texas’s human 
trafficking code, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 98.002,119 was 
enacted in 2009 and has recently started to gain traction and publicity.120 
 
115. See A Look Back: Building a Human Trafficking Legal Framework, POLARIS 
PROJECT (2014), https://polarisproject.org/sites/default/files/2014-Look-
Back.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9YG-R9U9]; Human Trafficking Enactment 
Database, supra note 9. 
116. See, e.g., Teigen, supra note 42, at 5 (“In South Carolina, a person who uses 
his or her business in a way that participates in human trafficking can be 
imprisoned for 10 years in addition to penalties for each trafficking 
violation.”); see also Sullivan & Leonardi, supra note 59 (noting that “virtually 
every state has enacted some form of anti-human trafficking legislation 
creating criminal and civil liability for corporations that benefit from labor 
and sexual exploitation”). 
117. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-170 (2019) (“Posting of National Human 
Trafficking Resource Center Hotline in certain establishments”); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 12-19-102 (2019) (“Posting information about the National Human 
Trafficking Resource Center Hotline”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5502.63(B)(1) 
(West 2019) (“[P]oster providing information regarding national human 
trafficking resource center hotline”); see generally Compendium of Human 
Trafficking Awareness Poster State Laws: A Resource Guide, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. 
(Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/
pictures/HT_Awareness_Poster_Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6M8-L5ZW]; 
Weiss, supra note 11. 
118. See, e.g., Louise Esola, The Hospitality Industry’s Lurking Liability, BUS. INS. 
(Aug. 7, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/
20170807/NEWS06/912314912/Sex-trafficking-hospitality-industry-
lurking-liability [https://perma.cc/VL2C-SDR5]. 
119. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 98.002(a) (West 2018). 
120. See Paul Cannon, Are Texas Trial Lawyers the Next Step in Battling Human 
Trafficking?, SIMMONS & FLETCHER, P.C. (Apr. 22, 2019), 
 
On January 23, 2018, a Jane Doe victim filed suit in Harris County, Texas 
against hotels, truck stops, and Backpage.com.121 She accused the “Hotel 
Defendants”122 of fostering “Hotbeds of Sexual Exploitation,” and her 
complaint described how “Human Trafficking and the Sexual Exploitation 
of Minors is a Rampant and Known Problem in the Hotel Industry.”123 She 
documented the specific red flags concerning her trafficking and alleged 
that the Defendants turned a blind eye, “refus[ing] to take any steps to 
alert the authorities, properly intervene in the situation, or take 
reasonable security steps to improve awareness of sex trafficking and/or 
prevent the sexual exploitation of minors at their properties.”124 In 
addition to section 98.002 violations, Jane Doe included causes of action 
against the Hotel Defendants for negligence125 and gross negligence,126 as 
well as common-law aiding and abetting.127 The lawsuit made national 




121. Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 59, 71, 76, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 
201804501-7 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2018). 
122. The “Hotel Defendants” include Choice Hotels International, Inc. D/B/A 
Quality Inn; Rutik, LLC, D/B/A Palace Inn; Hyatt Hotels Corporation; and 
Balaji Hotels, Inc. D/B/A Symphony Inn. Id. at 16. 
123. Id. at 55. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 76. 
126. Id. at 78. 
127. Id. at 77. 
128. See Susan Hogan et al., Lawsuits Accuse Hotels, Truck Stops of Turning Blind 
Eye to Sex Trafficking, NBC4 WASH. (May 1, 2018, 7:05 PM), 
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Lawsuits-Accuse-Hotels-
Truck-Stops-of-Turning-Blind-Eye-to-Sex-Trafficking-481290921.html 
[https://perma.cc/U27J-57B9]; Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, 
Human Trafficking Raises Corporate Liability Concerns for the Hospitality 
Industry, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=80aac912-598f-4526-94ee-003461fd544f [https:// perma.cc/
XUU2-CHX7]. Though the trial had been set for April 1, 2019 (according to 
the docket), the court granted Plaintiff’s Notice of Non-Suit Without 
Prejudice on November 9, 2018. Order on Plaintiff’s Notice of Non-Suit 
Without Prejudice 2, Jane Doe #1 v. Backpage.com, No. 201804501-7 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Nov. 9, 2018). 
Less than six weeks later in that same county, Janiece Charlez filed suit 
against Plainfield Inn, its owners and operators (Virani & Manav, LLC), and 
two directors and members of the LLC, on behalf of her deceased twenty-
one-year-old daughter, Natalie Fisher, who had been trafficked there.129 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knowingly benefitted from the 
human trafficking of Natalie, who was found “brutally murdered and 
dumped on the side of the road less than 10 miles from the Plainfield 
Inn.”130 Under Texas’s Survival Statutes,131 Charlez sought actual and 
exemplary damages for violations of section 98.002. 
In September 2014, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted Act 
105, comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation that created a far-reaching 
civil cause of action against providers of public goods or services that 
knowingly profited from the victim’s sex trade.132 On March 10, 2017, the 
lawyers of M.B., a seventeen-year-old girl, filed a civil suit under Act 105 
against Roosevelt Inn, a motel in Northeast Philadelphia. The lawsuit also 
named as defendants the motel’s owner, UFVS Management Co., which 
manages about forty commercial properties, and the motel’s resident 
manager, Yagna Patel.133 According to her lawyer, M.B. was “sold into 
sexual slavery” at the Roosevelt Motel when she was just fourteen years 
 
129. Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Request for Disclosure, Janiece Charlez v. 
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130. Id. at 3. 
131. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (West 2018). 
132. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3051(b)(1) (2014); see also id. §§ 3001-3072; New PA 
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old.134 During 2013 and 2014, M.B. spent weeks or months living at the 
motel, was barred from leaving, and was forced to commit sex acts with 
about 1,000 men “double, triple and quadruple her age.”135 The complaint 
alleged negligence under Act 105, in addition to common-law negligence, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.136 
Patel, the motel owner, has publicly responded to the allegations, 
claiming, “We just rent the room and that’s all we can do.”137 He added that 
“if we think a lot of people are having a party in the room, we kick them 
out.”138 But through the lawsuit, M.B. and her lawyer hope to challenge 
that common refrain—and eliminate it as a legal defense: 
I think the message is pretty clear and that is, if you’re going to run 
this type of business, make sure you have some idea of what’s 
occurring in your hallways and, if you know of this type of illegal 
activity, particularly involving children, you better do something 
about it.139 
Indeed, prosecutors were aware that the Roosevelt Inn had been a 
hotbed of prostitution and human trafficking; they even referred to the 
motel as Philadelphia’s “epicenter of human trafficking.”140 Law 
enforcement had investigated and prosecuted numerous crimes on the 
motel’s premises over the years, making it harder to credit Patel’s defense 
that he was unaware of any minors being abused or used in prostitution at 
 
134. Nadeem Bezar Comments On Human Trafficking Case On Canada CBC Radio, 
KLINE & SPECTER, PC (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.klinespecter.com/
nadeem-bezar-comments-on-human-trafficking-case-on-canana-cbc-
radio.html [https://perma.cc/S38R-TJ2W] [hereinafter Bezar Comments]. 
135. Slobodzian, supra note 133. 
136. Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 72-111, M.B. v. Roosevelt Inn, No. 170300712 
(Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 5, 2017); see Report on Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation in Pennsylvania, VILL. L. INST. TO ADDRESS COM. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
16 (Spring 2018), https://cseinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/2018-report-final-B-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KW6-6285]. 
137. Slobodzian, supra note 133. 
138. Id. 
139. Bezar Comments, supra note 134. 
140. Slobodzian, supra note 133. 
the motel.141 Given the systemic problems and criminal history on-site, 
police records will likely be a key aspect of the case, undermining or 
bolstering Patel’s mens rea-related claims. And, indeed, the presiding 
judge ordered discovery from the Township Police Department.142 The 
litigation is ongoing; the case is currently listed for a settlement 
conference, with a projected trial date of April 6, 2020.143 
Although the tide may be turning towards harnessing civil remedies in 
both state and federal court, the question now is whether these lawsuits 
are sufficient to shift the incentives of the hotel industry, or if there is still 
a better solution. 
III. TOWARD PRIVATE REGULATION 
Because defending against sex-trafficking claims is costly for hotels, it 
is unsurprising that these civil lawsuits spawn third-party insurance 
coverage disputes. Pursuing impact litigation against hotels—be it by a 
City Attorney’s Office, a State Attorney General’s Office, private plaintiffs, 
or the federal government—adds uncertainty. Not only do the lawsuits 
directly pressure the corporate entities, but they also burden their 
commercial insurers, who neither want to pay the expenses of protracted 
litigation nor be held liable for massive claims. Insurers therefore have 
sought declaratory judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that they have no 
duty to defend or indemnify their insured due to policy exclusions or 
public policy reasons144— a course of action that is only becoming more 
common.145 Ultimately, we should use the threat and unpredictability of 
 
141. Id. 
142. Judge Butchart directed the discovery sought in defendants’ subpoena on 
November 6, 2018. The Police Department must hand over all records, 
“including but not limited to records involving prostitution, solicitation, 
human trafficking and/or any other criminal activity, from 2012 to the 
present” relating to another defendant, the incarcerated Abdul Lopez, who 
was joined by the defendants. Court Docket, Roosevelt Inn, supra note 133. 
143. See id. 
144. Complaint at 1, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. UFVS Mgmt. Co., No. 2:18-CV-
03171-CDJ (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2018) (seeking a declaratory judgment under 28 
U.S.C. § 2201 for coverage obligations arising out of the M.B. v. Roosevelt Inn 
litigation). 
145. See, e.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, No. 17-
CV-3994, 2017 WL 4932856 (D. Ariz. Oct. 30, 2017). 
sex-trafficking litigation to pressure insurers into making wholesale 
changes in their hotel policy coverage.146 
A. An Insurance Primer 
At common law, liability insurance was thought to violate public 
policy.147 Such coverage can perpetuate the problem of “moral hazard,” the 
idea that insurance tends to “reduce the insured’s incentives to prevent 
harm.”148 By transferring the risk to the insurer and diluting the actions of 
the insured, liability insurance might ultimately lead to underdeterrence of 
the social harm we sought to reduce in the first place. At the same time, 
however, once an insurer assumes the liability risk, it develops a financial 
incentive to minimize that risk through loss prevention, which would 
lower payouts under the policy and maximize profits.149 
Hotels are typically insured under commercial general liability (CGL) 
policies, which protect them from various forms of liability and property 
risks.150 Although the contracting parties agree to the specific terms, a 
standard CGL policy often provides coverage for “bodily injury” or 
“property damage” caused by an “occurrence” or “accident” as defined by 
the policy. Insurers generally have no duty to defend their insured where 
there is no “occurrence” within the policy’s definition of that term.151 
Moreover, intentional acts usually do not constitute an “occurrence” or an 
“accident.”152 The recent coverage disputes arising out of trafficking cases 
 
146. In many respects, I envision what Professor John Rappaport suggests in his 
article regarding police liability insurance, though more research needs to be 
done to tailor solutions to the hotel industry. See John Rappaport, How 
Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (2017). 
147. Id., at 1553-54; Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits 
of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 947 (1988). 
148. Rappaport, supra note 146, at 1553-54. 
149. Id. at 1543-44. 
150. Commercial General Liability (C.G.L. or CGL), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012). 
151. 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 201:18 (3d ed. 2018) (Exclusion as to Intentional 
Acts); id. § 201:6 (Occurrence or Accident). 
152. Id. § 201:6. 
have focused on the “bodily injury” provision of CGL policies, which often 
include an “assault or battery exclusion” as well.153 
A “primary”154 CGL policy will provide some form of defense coverage 
to the policyholder, be it a “direct obligation to defend potentially covered 
third-party claims brought against the insured” or “an obligation to pay for 
or reimburse the costs of such defense.”155 Significantly, these policies may 
“provide defense coverage in addition to the limits of liability available 
under the policy for indemnity purposes.”156 In these circumstances, 
insurers would “be required to continue to provide defense coverage even 
though the amounts expended in defense might exceed the policies’ 
indemnity limits.”157 Thus, primary insurers may have a strong incentive 
to settle cases. 
Often, businesses have layers of coverage, and a hotel will not rely 
solely on a single CGL policy to satisfy all of its insurance needs.158 In 
addition to “primary” insurance, hotels might have umbrella or excess 
liability policies, which attach “only after exhaustion of a specified amount 
of primary coverage or self-insured retention.”159 Umbrella policies are 
valuable for the insured in that they “remove the insured’s burden of 
deciding among potential risks that could remain uncovered by the terms 
of the policy.”160 For that same reason, they are costly for those insurers 
 
153. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 673 (2018) (Specific Exclusion of Coverage for 
assault and battery). 
154. In contrast to policies subject to self-insured retentions, discussed infra note 
214, “primary” insurance” refers to coverage “that attaches at the first dollar 
of the policyholder’s loss or liability.” Policies containing deductibles can be 
“primary” insurance so long as “the insurer’s obligations to the policyholder 
arise at the first instance of loss or liability.” INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 




158. Id. (noting that commercial policyholders “frequently have complex 
insurance coverage programs involving multiple insurers and coverages”). 
159. Excess insurance (sometimes referred to as “pure excess”) and umbrella 
insurance policies (considered a form of excess insurance) both provide 
additional coverage over and above primary insurance, but they operate in 
different ways. Thomas S. Novak, The Defense Obligation of Excess and 
Umbrella Liability Insurance Policies, THE BRIEF, Fall 2006, at 12, 12. 
160. Id. at 13. 
that are unaware of the scope of their potential obligations, including 
defense coverage for sex-trafficking litigation. 
As with other contracts, insurance contracts that are inconsistent with 
public policy or have terms that promote, encourage, or effectuate a 
violation of the law are considered illegal and void.161 A state’s public 
policy is reflected in its constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions.162 
Because all states have human trafficking laws,163 in every state, policies 
that are seen as “encouraging” trafficking violations will be unenforceable. 
In practice, however, the analysis can become quite complicated, turning 
on the specific policy exclusions, plan language, and underlying claims at 
issue. 
B. Act 105 Collateral Litigation 
E.B. v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., an Act 105-related case out of 
Pennsylvania, provides a detailed study of insurance-driven collateral 
litigation.164 Similar to M.B.’s lawsuit against Roosevelt Inn, this plaintiff, a 
victim of sex trafficking in 2014, sued Motel 6, Neshaminy Inn, and the 
management services companies, including Motel Management Services 
(MMS), which owned, operated, and maintained the Neshaminy Inn.165 E.B. 
alleged negligent violation of Act 105, negligence, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.166 Specifically, the complaint alleged that MMS 
“knew or should have known that E.B. was a victim of human trafficking 
and that MMS individually or through its employees, agents or servants 
failed to report the activities to authorities and/or to intervene, disrupt or 
 
161. 7 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 101:11 (3d ed. 2018) (Public 
policy considerations). Therefore, provisions and policies that exclude from 
coverage “violations of law” or “criminal acts” have been deemed valid. Id. § 
103:40 (Generally Criminal Acts; Violations of Law). 
162. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 276 (2018) (Basis of public policy). 
163. See supra note 115. 
164. E.B. v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., No. 170500487 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. May 2, 
2017); see supra note 132. 
165. Complaint at ¶¶ 4-5, 15, E.B. v. Motel 6, No. 170500487. 
166. Id. at ¶¶ 9-16. See id. at ¶¶ 52-58. E.B. also sought $50,000 in compensatory 
and punitive damages. Id. at ¶ 69. 
otherwise stop the human trafficking of E.B.”167 MMS sought over $75,000 
in coverage for this underlying action, but its insurance providers fought 
back. 
MMS was insured by First Financial Insurance Company (FFIC) 
through September 1, 2014, and by Nautilus Insurance Company 
thereafter. After FFIC brought suit for a declaratory action against MMS,168 
the parties settled, stipulating that the “occurrences” for which the plaintiff 
sought damages against MMS took place after the expiration of the FFIC 
policy.169 
Like FFIC, Nautilus also filed suit under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 requesting a 
declaration of its coverage obligations. It argued that the claim in E.B.’s 
underlying action against MMS was for assault and therefore excluded 
from coverage by its own policy’s assault and battery exception. 
Furthermore, Nautilus argued that, as a matter of public policy, there can 
be no duty to defend or indemnify an insured for allegations of human 
trafficking. Ultimately, Nautilus prevailed on both grounds. 
Beginning on September 1, 2014, MMS was covered by a standard CGL 
policy, under which Nautilus would “pay those sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or 
‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.”170 Nautilus, however, 
would “have no duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking 
damages for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance 
does not apply.”171 The central question, therefore, turned on how the 
policy delimited “bodily injury.” The policy applied to “bodily injury” only 
if it was caused by an “occurrence,” defined as “an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
harmful conditions.”172 Bodily injury that was “[a]ctual or alleged assault 
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or battery,” “[r]egardless of culpability or intent of any person” was 
excluded from coverage under the “All Assault of Battery Exclusion.”173 
In assessing Nautilus’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 
district court reviewed the claims made by E.B. and compared their 
statutory definitions with the policy’s language. As defined by the policy 
terms, “assault and battery” included “negligent conduct on the part of the 
insured or its employees that directly harms another person, whether 
through negligent failure to prevent an assault, negligence related to an 
actual or threatened assault, or negligence resulting in battery.”174 
Therefore, even “assuming MMS breached its duty to E.B. in negligently 
failing to report the sex trafficking occurring on its premises,” the claims 
arising from such conduct were excluded from coverage by the “All Assault 
or Battery Exclusion.”175 Moreover, because financially benefiting from 
human sex trafficking is criminalized under the Pennsylvania Human 
Trafficking Law, public policy precluded coverage as well.176 
C. Jane Does #1-4 Case Study 
Although Nautilus won its arguments, the outcome of each case is 
idiosyncratic, and highly dependent on the particular policy and 
jurisdiction. A Federal District Court in Maryland, for instance, recently 
ruled against an insurance provider, Millers Capital Insurance Company, at 
the summary judgment stage.177 There were four underlying cases at issue. 
On February 21 and 22, 2017, Jane Does #1-4 filed individual lawsuits in 
the Circuit Court of Wicomico County, Maryland related to a November 
2014 human-trafficking bust.178 All victims filed suit against Choice Hotels 
 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 643. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. See Millers Capital Ins. Co. v. Vasant, No. 18-CV-00553-RDB, 2018 WL 
5295899 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2018). 
178. The associated docket numbers are C-22-CV-17-000071; C-22-CV-17-
000072; C-22-CV-17-000073; and C-22-CV-17-000074. Though I could not 
find the complaints, news outlets reported that the victims accused 
America’s Best Value Inn in Salisbury, Maryland “of knowing that the they 
had been held there against their will and were forced to perform sex acts 
with men who had been seen — by hotel staff and by customers writing 
reviews of the establishment on travel websites, reporting obvious signs of 
 
and Vasu, Inc., among others,179 for injuries sustained after suffering 
various forms of abuse by a human-trafficking and prostitution ring.180 
The majority of the alleged abuse took place at America’s Best Value 
Inn, but for a short period of time, the perpetrators used Econo Lodge, 
owned by Vasu, Inc. and franchised by Choice Hotel, to conduct their 
operations. 181 The Jane Doe plaintiffs alleged that “they were moved to an 
Econo Lodge franchised by Choice Hotel and held against their will until 
they were moved again.”182 While held captive, they were “forced to pose 
for provocative pictures that were posted on a website soliciting 
prostitution, they were forced to perform sexual intercourse as 
prostitutes, and they were forced to perform sexual acts on the 
perpetrators, often drugged.”183 The plaintiffs’ claims against Vasu, Inc. 
and Choice Hotels in particular included “negligence (premises liability), 
negligent training/supervision, and respondeat superior on the ground that 
the Econo Lodge failed to properly monitor and secure the hotel premises, 
ignored signs of criminal activity, and failed to investigate complaints 
regarding criminal activity.”184 
Millers Capital Insurance Company became involved in the litigation 
because it was the insurance provider of defendants Vasu, Inc. and Choice 
Hotels.185 Millers Capital filed suit seeking a declaration it had no duty to 
defend or indemnify the defendants as a result of the underlying Jane Doe 
 
trafficking — in and around the hotel.” Esola, supra note 118. See also Jeremy 
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owner, and Vantage Hospitality Group, the parent company of the America’s 
Best Value Inn Brand. See Cox, supra note 178. 
180. Complaint at 5, Millers Capital Ins. Co. v. Vasant, No. 18-CV-00553-MJG (D. 
Md. Feb. 23, 2018). 
181. Millers Capital Ins. Co., 2018 WL 5295899, at *2, *4. 
182. Id. at *2. 
183. Id. 
184. Complaint at 5, Millers Capital Ins. Co., No. 18-CV-00553-MJG. 
185. Because defendant Choice Hotel is a franchisor of the named insureds, it is 
named as an “additional insured” under the Policy. Millers Capital Ins. Co., 
2018 WL 5295899, at *1. 
actions.186 The defendants had taken out a CGL policy, under which Millers 
Capital had a “duty to defend the insured against any suit seeking bodily 
injury and property damages liability as well as personal and advertising 
injury liability, within stated limits and exclusions.”187 One of the stated 
limits was the “Abuse or Molestation Exclusion.”188 Millers Capital denied 
its duty to defend its insureds in the underlying cases “based solely on the 
Abuse or Molestation Endorsement in its insurance policy.”189 As 
explained by the court, this endorsement modified the CGL coverage by 
adding an exclusion to the standard “bodily injury and property damage” 
and “personal advertising injury” coverage provisions: The policy did not 
cover those injuries or damages “arising out of the actual or threatened 
abuse or molestation by anyone of any person while in the care, custody or 
control of any insured.”190 
After reviewing the policy in light of Maryland precedent and 
evaluating the specific circumstances of the case, the court denied Millers 
Capital’s motion because the endorsement, its sole ground for excluding 
coverage, did not apply. It was “evident that none of the Defendant 
Insureds or their employees had the abuse victims under their care, 
custody, or control.”191 Rather, the testimony showed that the “wrong-
doers actively prevented Econo Lodge from knowing about the victims, 
deliberately keeping them hidden.”192 Because there was no evidence “that 
the hotel was ever aware of the victims being on its premises,” the hotel 
could not have had the Jane Doe victims “under its ‘care, custody or 
control.’”193 The court therefore ruled that Millers Capital had the duty to 
defend “all insured Defendants” in the four underlying lawsuits and to 
reimburse Choice Hotels for the defense costs already incurred, as well as 
 
186. Complaint at 2, Millers Capital Ins. Co., No. 18-CV-00553-MJG. 
187. Millers Capital Ins. Co., 2018 WL 5295899, at *1 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
188. Complaint at 5, Millers Capital Ins. Co., No. 18-CV-00553-MJG. 
189. Millers Capital Ins. Co., 2018 WL 5295899, at *1. 
190. Id. at *1-2. 
191. Id. at *1. 
192. Id. at *7. 
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the attorney’s fees and costs spent pursuing and defending the collateral 
action.194 
D. 18 U.S.C. § 1595 Collateral Litigation 
Insurance companies are clearly starting to take a stand against those 
that facilitate human trafficking—perhaps out of social responsibility, or 
perhaps to avoid a massive expense.195 
Within ninety days of M.A.’s § 1595 complaint filing in federal court, 
the relevant insurers of the defendant hotels— Nationwide Insurance 
Company and American Family Mutual Insurance Company—had moved 
to intervene as plaintiffs.196 At stake was $11,000,000 in coverage from 
CGL and commercial umbrella policies,197 and each insurer sought a 
declaratory judgment on the “purported duty to defend and indemnify” the 
defendants under them.198 Nationwide further requested participation in 
“the development of the factual record.”199 It argued that its “substantial 
legal interest” (i.e., potential responsibility for indemnifying the 
 
194. Id. When the court issued this opinion on October 25, 2018, the four 
underlying cases, which were consolidated on March 8, 2018, had already 
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197. Nationwide Motion at 6. 
198. Id. at 5; see American Family Motion at 2. 
199. Nationwide Motion at 8. 
defendants)200 would be impaired absent intervention. Not only would the 
insurers face “collateral estoppel on issues of fact decided in this case in 
the event of a supplemental proceeding to collect a judgment against the 
insured(s) under the Policy,” but they would also face additional “expense 
interests.”201 For instance, depositions and written discovery might be 
duplicative if all claims and interests were not consolidated in the same 
suit.202 
The question of coverage responsibility under the Nationwide and 
American Family Insurance policies is still uncertain—and will be until a 
declaratory judgment is issued, despite the built-in policy exclusions. 
According to Nationwide, because certain claims made by M.A.—including 
that the defendants acted intentionally or with “willful blindness” and 
“knowingly benefited” from the trafficking activities—require further 
factual development,203 both the victim-plaintiff and the defendant-hotels 
are aligned in their motivation “to characterize any such potential damage 
in a light that will maximize the potential for coverage.”204 Only the 
insurance companies have an “interest in properly characterizing any non-
covered or excluded conduct or damage as such.”205 
* * * *  
Insurers have a great incentive to rewrite their policies in accordance 
with the most recent state laws to avoid gray areas and, ultimately, a duty 
to defend or indemnify these underlying actions. Although insurance 
companies are notoriously reactive, several aspects of the sex-trafficking 
litigation should spur them to action. First, insurance companies like 
 
200. Id. at 9; see also id. at 10 (“If the Plaintiff is successful in her claims against 
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205. Id. 
predictability.206 Thus far, the litigation is new and unsettled. Faced with 
“excessive uncertainties,” the insurance industry cannot properly diversify 
the risks and price their hotel policies among their portfolio.207 Because of 
the unpredictable outcomes, insurance companies (and the hotels 
themselves) will prefer settling these cases to paying more money in 
protracted litigation.208 
Second, “insurers want the law to be nonretroactive,” meaning they 
have “strong incentives to prevent unforeseeable payouts that were not 
priced into the premiums they previously collected.”209 But this is 
precisely what is happening now: Many of the new TVPA claims arose 
from incidents that happened years ago, when the insureds had yet to sign 
the Code of Conduct for the Protection of Children from Sexual 
Exploitation in Travel and Tourism210 (and before insurers themselves 
were aware of the threat of sex-trafficking liability). Thus, by undermining 
expectations, the trailblazing lawsuits may cause the insurance companies 
to re-evaluate the policies and exclusions used today, as well as what other 
tools they “can use to protect themselves from catastrophic retroactive 
liability.”211 
Moreover, there may come a time when the insurance industry finds 
that protecting itself from these claims is a business necessity. Take, for 
instance, the now-infamous (and omnipresent) asbestos litigation.212 
When asbestos exposure was first occurring, no one was aware of the 
risks. The insurance policies that existed back then did not exclude 
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asbestos exposure. Now, however, it will be nearly impossible to find a 
contract that does not have an asbestos exclusion.213 
In the sex-trafficking context, too, the insurance industry will respond 
to the threat only when lawsuits reach a critical mass. Though part of its 
reaction will focus on how to best avoid covering these costly claims, 
insurance companies must simultaneously ensure that their customers—
the insured hotels—do not go bankrupt themselves. If insurance carriers 
refuse to defend the hotel operators and owners ex ante, they should force 
their insureds either to agree to self-insure or to a steep “self-insured 
retention.”214 And if third-party facilitators such as hotel management 
companies are left to dispute sex-trafficking charges without the financial 
cushion of primary insurance, the hospitality industry might then step up 
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policy; Judy Greenwald, Asbestos Exclusion Shields Travelers Unit From 
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amount of the SIR has been reached, the insurer is not compelled to defend 
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and start learning about this tremendously misunderstood crime. Hotels 
will be incentivized to be proactive in eliminating misconduct and to err 
on the side of caution. This is especially true for many small chains or 
franchisees, for which the out-of-pocket litigation costs may be prohibitive. 
Regardless of the precise route, the insurance industry can (and 
should) capitalize on hotels’ exposure by drafting policies to exclude 
trafficking claims within each jurisdiction and forcing hotels to self-insure, 
either partly or in full. Not only would restricting coverage conserve 
resources for insurance providers, but it would also lead to greater self-
policing and reporting within the hotel industry. 
IV. A MORE ACCOUNTABLE INDUSTRY 
A. All Words, What Action? 
For now, accountability to victims of sex trafficking is sorely lacking. 
Hotels are attempting to avoid litigation by rooting out the underlying 
criminal conduct, a lofty goal, but perhaps a naïve one, given the complex 
dynamics at work in this area.215 The hospitality industry’s weapon of 
choice is education, but it may not be powerful enough. 
Indeed, education is a critical first step to combatting trafficking, and a 
number of hotels have already implemented training programs.216 The 
Department of Homeland Security launched a “Blue Campaign” to guide 
hotels and their various sectors in identifying signs of trafficking,217 and 
individual states are debating legislation that would require hotels to join 
the fight in various ways.218 The American Hotel and Lodging Association 
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has produced an online training course for its members,219 and various 
state associations have also developed region-specific training.220 
It is encouraging that this push for change has come from the industry 
itself. For instance, the Code of Conduct for the Protection of Children from 
Sexual Exploitation in Travel and Tourism (“The Code”) is a voluntary, 
industry-driven set of business principles to prevent child sex tourism and 
the trafficking of children.221 Created in 1996 as a practical tool for the 
tourism industry, The Code provides support to private sector businesses 
worldwide in developing responsible tourism or corporate social 
responsibility policies.222 Companies that sign The Code commit to taking 
“six essential steps to help protect children”: (1) establishing a policy and 
procedures against the sexual exploitation of children; (2) training 
employees; (3) including a zero-tolerance clause in contracts; (4) 
providing information to travelers; (5) supporting, collaborating and 
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In the past two decades, The Code has increased in prominence and 
reach; its impact is not limited to child victims. The Code has been 
acknowledged as an example of “best practices” by U.N. organizations and 
incorporated into the overarching tourism policy of numerous 
governments and organizations.224 Over 360 companies worldwide have 
become members of The Code,225 and their adherence to its six criteria can 
be tracked online.226 
ECPAT-USA, the leading anti-child-trafficking non-profit organization 
in the United States, brought The Code to North America in 2004.227 
Carlson Hotels was the first company to sign in the United States—at the 
2004 launch228—but not all U.S.-based chains were as quick to 
subscribe.229 Hilton Worldwide signed in April of 2011,230 and when 
Wyndham Worldwide joined later that year, it was just the fifth U.S. 
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company to do so (out of more than 1,000 members worldwide).231 
Though parts of the AccorHotels Group joined The Code as early as 
2006,232 the U.S. was the 38th country in its network to sign — in January 
2016.233 Marriott only became a member in January 2018.234 
Besides signing The Code, hotel chains have collaborated with non-
profit organizations and supported human-trafficking survivors—adults 
and children—in various ways. In 2012, Hyatt joined with Polaris to create 
a global training program on human trafficking for managers and line 
staff.235 Touting its “aggressive stance on identifying and working to 
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prevent human trafficking,” including sex and labor trafficking of adults 
and children,236 Hyatt also developed the International Tourism 
Partnership’s Position Statement on Human Trafficking and provides 
hospitality skills training to human-trafficking survivors through the Youth 
Career Initiative.237 Hilton partnered with the Global Fund for Children in 
April 2014 to create the Hilton Worldwide Anti-Trafficking Fund, which 
supports “innovative grassroots organizations working every day to help 
children who have been or are at risk of being trafficked.”238 It was the first 
hospitality company to join the Global Business Initiative on Human Rights 
in 2016239 and a founding member of the UK Stop Slavery Hotel Industry 
Network.240 Not to be left behind, in November 2017, Marriott 
International announced plans to train 100% of personnel in human 
trafficking awareness by 2025, as well as to provide additional training on 
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partnering with ECPAT-USA in January 2018,242 Marriott gives its Rewards 
members the option of donating their loyalty points to the organization.243 
Admirable as all these “shining exemplary initiatives”244 are, a cynic 
could write them off as self-interested marketing ploys. The policies serve 
as fodder for flashy press releases and positive PR—an easy way to 
improve reputation by demonstrating good corporate governance and 
ethical responsibility.245 In fact, many business-oriented or investor-
focused articles have recognized these initiatives as signals of corporate 
social responsibility.246 Jones Day has advised corporations that “taking a 
proactive approach to compliance with state and federal anti-trafficking 
laws is not only responsible, good governance,” but also good for 
business.247 Increasing efforts to combat sex trafficking to respond to 
socially conscious consumers is not a new strategy, or one limited to this 
issue. In fact, corporations are now often pressured to act on hot-button 
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issues where the government will not, as consumers vote with their 
pocketbooks.248 
At bottom, these efforts are all “carrots”; hotels are rewarded with 
enhanced status as they attempt to out-do-good one another. Admittedly, 
in the process, others reap substantial benefits as well. Hotels have the 
platform and financial resources to create meaningful change by signing 
onto initiatives, pledging support for the cause, and raising basic 
awareness of the issue. 
But in the race to win the praise of the public, the sex-trafficking 
victims—already drawn from vulnerable populations249—are 
deprioritized; their needs are subordinated to the economic concerns of 
the business. This failure is exemplified by yet another high-profile case in 
which a victim, K.R., filed suit against the Quality Inn in Dothan, Alabama 
and its parent company, Choice Hotels. She alleged that the defendants 
“conspired, enabled and/or otherwise worked together in a sex trafficking 
venture in which K.R. was victimized when she was just 17 years old,” in 
violation of both common law and Alabama’s anti-human trafficking 
statute.250 
The victim chose to sue Choice Hotels because of the overall role of the 
hotel industry in sex trafficking, as well as the specific chain’s actions—or 
lack thereof—in other sex-trafficking cases.251 According to K.R., after a 
child was raped and killed at a Comfort Inn, another Choice Hotels brand, 
in November 2009, Choice Hotels could have taken action, but it 
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The action was removed to federal court on May 5, 2017 before being sent 
back to the Houston County Circuit Court on August 18, 2017. See K.R. v. 
Backpage.com, No. 1:17-CV-00299-WKW-DAB (M.D. Ala. May 5, 2017). 
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_survivor_files.html [https://perma.cc/BS6D-PATD]. 
“repeatedly failed to make reasonable efforts to stop these crimes.”252 
Choice Hotels partnered with ECPAT-USA the following year to develop a 
training module to educate management and staff in the prevention of sex 
trafficking. However, it “did not require its employees to complete this 
training,” and it waited until April 29, 2015 to sign The Code.253 K.R. 
contended that the Dothan Quality Inn, like its parent company, failed to 
act on numerous “open and obvious” red flags that should have alerted 
hotel employees to the illegal activity of K.R.’s trafficker.254 
In her own complaint under the TVPA, M.A. cites K.R.’s case as 
indicative of the hotel defendants’ “same entrenched, pervasive willful 
blindness to sex trafficking”—both before and after their adoption of The 
Code—that facilitated her own sex trafficking.255 Choice Hotels, for 
instance, “chose not to invest the time to implement and execute the anti-
trafficking program. Instead, the only steps they took were to advertise to 
the public that they had implemented human trafficking policies.”256 
Similarly, Wyndham Worldwide Corporation signed The Code in 2011, but 
M.A. alleged that this, too, was mere lip service: 
[A]s evidenced by the widespread sex trafficking which continued 
to occur at Defendant Wyndham’s branded properties, Defendant 
Wyndham did not practice what it preached. Defendant 
Wyndham’s adoption of the Code appears to have been nothing 
more than a strategic maneuver through which it sought a shield 
against liability but not a sword against human trafficking.257 
These lawsuits, like many others, condemned the hotels and sought to 
hold them liable for turning a blind eye or ignoring obvious red flags. 
Though the recent, press-grabbing litigation out of Pennsylvania, 
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Maryland, Alabama, and Texas has been met with concern from the hotel 
industry, most of the commentary and suggestions for protecting against 
civil (and criminal) liability emphasize training.258 For instance, the 
director and founder of Businesses Ending Slavery and Trafficking 
published an article about the E.B. v. Motel 6 case and the favorable 
Nautilus Insurance ruling. It, too, prioritized training: 
This court ruling and its resulting denial of insurance coverage 
should be setting off alarm bells across the hospitality industry 
that it’s time to implement comprehensive human trafficking 
awareness training programs for employees to help hotels address 
all forms of commercial sexual exploitation. This is an essential 
step that hotel owners and management groups can take to reduce 
their liability and protect their assets.259 
The problem with this approach is that training, while a necessary 
condition, is itself insufficient to rid the hotel industry of trafficking. 
B. Real Solutions 
The most promising way to disrupt sex traffickers’ reliance on 
hotels—and to force hotels to practice what they preach—is through 
insurance coverage. Yet this particular approach is often overlooked, even 
by “neutral” third parties. Hotels have an obvious disincentive in 
proposing this solution, but NGOs and other non-profits with less of a 
financial interest have also shied away from suggesting a negative form of 
liability for hotels.260 For instance, ECPAT-USA’s “No Vacancy” Report, 
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260. There is a possibility that these third parties are receiving significant 
financial support from their hotel partners such that they do, in fact, have a 
reason to not propose this course of action. 
which documents the efficacy of ECPAT-USA’s work in preventing and 
disrupting the commercial sexual exploitation of children in hotels, says 
nothing about insurance or this type of market-based solution.261 Instead, 
the report focuses on training. 
But as indicated by the latest lawsuits, especially those with repeat 
defendants like Choice Hotels, training is not the antidote to human 
trafficking. Training can be incomplete; its lessons need not be acted upon. 
Even companies that have joined The Code are not at full compliance with 
training or reporting.262 Because industry fear intensifies when a lawsuit 
commences, we must capitalize on the legal shockwaves, and their 
financial consequences, to spur hotels to action. 
Although education is essential to identifying the underlying 
trafficking conduct,263 the industry should not stop there. It should take 
affirmative steps, above and beyond training, to prevent sex trafficking. As 
with The Code, some of this movement could be industry-driven. Hotels 
could install more surveillance cameras and eliminate cash transactions; 
they could insist on regular housekeeping entry into rooms, better monitor 
their guest registries for repeated suspicious usage through spreadsheets, 
and encourage reporting to hotlines (or police) at the first warning 
signs.264 To better oversee on-site management (and avoid problems with 
self-reporting), the parent company’s executives or legal team could “put a 
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crime grid” on their individual franchises by making open records requests 
of all police reports alleged to have occurred at the properties.265 
Such vigilant self-regulation, however, might seem superfluous—an 
unnecessary cost to the company when corporate executives perhaps 
know sex trafficking occurs, just not in their hotels.266 Whether the 
motivation for inaction is “limitless corporate greed”267 or something less 
sinister such as lack of foresight,268 there is much headway to be made. 
Perhaps hoteliers still do not recognize the potential ways they are at risk 
of being held liable. They might believe (and reasonably at this point) that 
prosecution is a nearly nonexistent risk, or that their insurance would take 
care of the claims regardless.269 
But hotel owners will react if demands are made in their insurance 
policy, if every month they have to pay a higher premium because of their 
sex-trafficking risk factors—if the costs of their inaction are made plain in 
their bottom lines. To fully ensure an adequate level of diligence and 
compliance, insurance companies should use all the tools at their disposal 
to create a workable and easy-to-implement system that adequately 
translates economic profitability into the value of human life. 
I envision the insurance industry acting as the primary external 
regulators of hotels by categorizing, critiquing, and policing the 
businesses’ conduct. This system would resemble the State Department’s 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reporting, where countries are evaluated “on 
the extent of governments’ efforts to meet the TVPA’s minimum standards 
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=news+brief [https://perma.cc/W379-8GXF] (recommending hiring off-duty 
officers to protect the property). 
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(advising the “wise hotel keeper to make sure that the premises are as ‘crime 
proof’ as possible” and to carry “adequate insurance”). 
for the elimination of human trafficking.”270 Countries are rated annually 
on a scale of Tier 1 (the highest score) to Tier 3 (the lowest).271 Tier 3 
countries may be subject to certain restrictions on U.S. government 
assistance, including withheld funding for non-humanitarian, non-trade-
related foreign assistance.272 
For better or worse, TIP’s classification system, and corresponding 
funding restrictions, are powerful anti-trafficking incentives for countries. 
The insurance industry could similarly induce hotels to adopt beneficial 
policies and practices by tying trafficking risk factors directly to the cost of 
a hotel’s CGL policy. As with auto insurance, certain groups affect the cost 
of a premium; younger male drivers, for instance, are riskier as a group. 
Likewise, a Choice Hotels franchisee, having been embroiled in several 
lawsuits already, may be a prime target for an increased insurance 
premium. Its prior history can be analogized to “points” on a driving 
record, and its position in a “higher risk” bracket may have additional 
conditions attached, such as unannounced, third-party checks of the 
premises—what Justice Scalia envisioned in Patel. 
Insurance companies should incorporate the risk of sex trafficking on 
premises into their overall valuation assessments, creating something like 
an actuarial table.273 Instead of life expectancy probability, the table would 
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compare and incorporate a hotel’s geographic location, its extended-stay 
policies, most used payment methods, and prior criminal incidents at the 
establishment (among other relevant risk factors) to price out coverage. 
Insurers would identify the most effective deterrence mechanisms ex ante. 
The table’s informational input would be drawn from third-party 
produced compliance reports to ensure accuracy and reliability. If an 
incident at a hotel gives rise to liability, these reports will help insurance 
companies gauge whether or not to indemnify the hotel. If the company 
chooses not to indemnify the hotel under a particular policy, both parties 
could seek to introduce the reports into evidence in the collateral litigation 
(or motions to intervene) for the court to consider. Or, if an insurance 
company agrees to indemnify the hotel but, pursuant to the point system 
proposed above, plans to increase the hotel’s policy rate, the hotel could 
utilize the report as a kind of good-faith defense or negotiation tool to 
prevent the insurance spike. 
The insurance industry can create such a system, though the political 
motivation has not yet coalesced behind its application to the sex-
trafficking context.274 Although more research needs to be done, I suspect 
the insurance industry’s financial incentive is not significant enough for 
such a change, unlike in asbestos litigation or in the police fatality context, 
where a police shooting can bankrupt a municipality.275 This passivity is 
unfortunate because a comprehensive regime shift, in which the insurance 
industry transforms the power dynamic of CGL contracting, would be 
consequential for the hotel industry. 
Even if the progress made in the policing context is not on the 
immediate horizon for sex trafficking in the hotel industry, similar 
potential exists. Insurance companies already rely on underwriters, who 
analyze and evaluate an applicant’s risks—and recommend a price to offer 
for coverage, if at all—using specific guidelines set by the companies, 
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website only pulls up venues for past and future insurance conferences—
there is nothing policy-related about sex trafficking. Similarly, when I 
reached out to insurance brokers in the hospitality industry, I received a 
standard response that sex trafficking was not on their radar. 
275. Bankrupting an insured is not good business for the insurance company. 
specialized software, and actuarial data.276 The underwriting process is 
“closely linked to rating, or price setting” and together, they serve to 
discourage risky behavior by the insureds.277 The insurer can use 
“differentiated premiums” to charge higher rates to riskier hotels, 
identified as such through either “experience rating” (based on “loss 
history”) or “feature rating” (based on the “presence of traits correlated 
with riskiness”).278  
Moreover, the insurance companies themselves already “engage in 
loss prevention by helping an insured identify and implement techniques 
for reducing the risk of loss.”279 As part of their risk management services, 
insurers publish newsletters and guidance, offer toolkits and training 
programs, and employ industry experts and industry data to help their 
commercial insureds craft individualized risk-reduction plans.280 In the 
environmental arena, for instance, liability insurers make “on-site visits 
and instruct policyholders on how to avoid costly damages” and 
“[p]ollution insurance underwriters send engineers to the sites to examine 
how landfills are engineered and built, and how waste is disposed.”281 In 
effect, the insurers implement “private safety codes” for policyholders to 
comply with that are “managed and audited by third parties such as 
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REV. 197, 211 (2012) (discussing examples in the context of workers’ 
compensation insurers, products liability insurers, and environmental 
liability insurers). 
281. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 280, at 211. 
accreditation agencies.”282 These standards often exceed the stringency 
required by government regulators.283 The same on-site monitoring and 
individualized instructions could be utilized in the sex-trafficking industry, 
and an insurer could ultimately deny coverage, cancel it, or refuse to 
renew a policy unless the insured adopts certain loss prevention 
measures.284 
An effective auditing system, either on an as-needed or regular basis, is 
critical to implementing these loss prevention efforts as well.285 Insurance 
companies could, for example, set up an undercover investigation system 
applicable to a range of hotels broader than just those with a bad track 
record.286 As consumers seeking to lower the insurance premiums 
calculated by underwriters, hotels could affirmatively hire external 
consultants to investigate their policies and procedures,287 implement 
safeguards against sex trafficking,288 and regularly produce 
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comprehensive compliance reports. In certain circumstances, including for 
motels in high-risk locations, insurance companies might mandate that 
hotels hire a corporate compliance monitor in order to lower their 
premiums (or gain coverage in the first place).289 The upshot is that 
insurance companies, not the hotels, wield the ultimate power through 
price setting. 
Changing this power dynamic will not be simple. Like the municipal 
liability market, CGL and umbrella policies for hotels exist in a “soft 
insurance market,” where “insurers tend to be more lax about 
underwriting, and less forceful about loss prevention, as they compete for 
premium dollars and market share.”290 Add this competitive environment 
to the reality that the most problematic hotels tend to be “lower end.”291 
Although possibly known to law enforcement as hotbeds of trafficking, 
these hotels—like the Motel 6 in Sylmar—are difficult for market 
insurance to regulate effectively because it is “not cost-effective for 
insurers to individualize loss prevention or engage in the monitoring 
necessary to link premiums to care.”292 For this problematic market 
segment, where myriad insurance brokers compete for one fairly standard 
commercial policy, the hotels currently wield the power. A bigger profile 
(i.e., multiple hotels under the same owner) would be needed for an 
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insurer—or its underwriter—to become actively involved in monitoring 
and investigating operations and procedures. Thus, for now, self-insured 
retentions (SIRs) may be critical to keeping hotels’ “skin in the game.”293 
But because of the power retained by hotels, which have plentiful options 
for coverage, a regulatory mandate may be necessary to ensure that SIRs 
are written into the insurance policies.294 
Any private system between the hotels and their insurance companies 
that is set up to establish anti-trafficking norms should be reinforced with 
government actors. Take, for instance, the explosion of prosecutions under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the last fifteen years.295 The 
DOJ has become the global enforcer of anti-bribery norms (not without 
criticism),296 and its deployment of the FCPA has ensured that companies 
worldwide comply with U.S. values and business practices. With the huge 
fines imposed as part of settlement agreements,297 multinational 
corporations have taken on the costs of internal investigations, hiring law 
firms to root out misconduct and avoid indictment. The incentive to 
disclose and cooperate is magnified because, in general, insurance policies 
do not cover FCPA claims, just as they would not cover sex-trafficking 
claims.298 Similarly, if prosecutors and private plaintiffs more regularly 
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begin to use the TVPA’s restitution and fine provisions, hotels have a 
greater financial incentive to enlist third parties (including law firms) to 
act as private investigators even before they are targeted by the 
government. When charges are brought, a self-reporting hotel that seeks 
help will be treated better and with more leniency.299 
Public accountability should serve as an additional pressure point. If 
government regulators reach settlements with corporate actors, those 
agreements should be publicized. Whether or not corporations cooperate 
and comply with the settlement terms300 would factor into consumers’ 
market decisions, at least for the patrons who prioritize socially 
responsible hotels.301 Especially for a crime that is already so difficult to 
police, it is critical to develop a synergistic regulatory scheme among 
private interests and public actors that imposes the greatest oversight of 
hotels and exploits all economic liabilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Hotels must put their money where their juridical mouth is. Their 
appeal as human-trafficking harbors should hold them to a higher 
standard—an increased responsibility to guard against the crime. But 
insurance companies are the yet unrecognized torchbearers for real 
change. They have a wealth of options, which can be used creatively and 
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effectively in conjunction with public sentiment and government 
enforcement, in the fight to end sex trafficking. Insurers are well equipped 
to rein in wayward hotel owners through the tools they use on a regular 
basis across industries, including underwriting analysis, rating systems, 
differentiated premiums, SIRs, loss-prevention techniques, and audits. 
But before we enlist the help of the insurance companies—and tap 
into their influence—we must impress upon them their own power and 
vulnerabilities in the sex-trafficking context. Like hotels, they too, must be 
spurred to action. Even if a widespread overhaul in hospitality liability 
insurance is too great a shift for such a reactive business, out of self-
preservation, the industry cannot ignore the lawsuits coming down the 
pike. 
I hope this Note has planted the seeds for dialogue and encourages 
insurers to proactively develop socially beneficial policies. By 
acknowledging and anticipating the costly litigation, insurance companies 
can capitalize on the opportunity to “convert rising liability risk to 
actionable events.”302 Not only would they protect their own bottom lines, 
but they would also decrease the incidence of sex trafficking in hotels. As 
the recent lawsuits teach us, we must embrace and leverage every little bit 
of financial pressure: Even for combatting human rights violations, money 
talks. 
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